This revisionist view, however, has itself been cast into doubt by Thomas Weiss's recent estimates of farm labor productivity, based on a revised set of labor force figures. According to Weiss's series, output per agricultural worker, excluding the value of home manufactures and farm improvements, grew at an average annual rate of 1.62 percent between 1860 and 1870, the fastest rate of the nineteenth century. With the value of home manufactures and farm improvements included, output per worker increased at 1.35 percent per year, also the fastest rate for the century.7 Under this evidence, the decade of the 1860s did not merely mark a point of transition to a more productive agriculture, it appears to have led the way.
The new productivity series would seem to give renewed credence to the traditional view of historians concerning the pace of nineteenthcentury agricultural productivity growth and the influence of the Civil War. We contend, however, that this apparent rapid growth in agricultural labor productivity during the 1860s is largely an artifact of the way labor inputs were measured. We argue that mechanization was relatively unimportant in this period and stress instead an increase in labor inputs, especially an increase in the labor of women and children devoted to market production. Although the output of their increased labor is reflected in the conventional statistics, their input is not fully captured in the census labor force figures.8
In this article, then, we address the issue of agricultural productivity from two perspectives. First, we analyze the decade's performance using Weiss's revised, conventionally measured output per worker series. This series, like the revisionist one, uses the Towne and Rasmussen estimates of farm output and labor force estimates based on census data. It is this analysis that tells the story of the singular growth of agricultural output per worker during the Civil War decade. We then present an alternative measure of productivity which avoids the problem of underenumeration of female and child workers and captures the effect of any increases in workers' hours and effort. Our results show that the real value of the marginal contribution of each group of workers (men, women, and children) increased during the Civil War decade, and that most of this rise probably resulted from an increase in the amount of time or effort they spent in agricultural production for the market. The increase in the marketed output of farm products that came from "women's work" explains much of the enormous increase in output per worker that materialized over the decade. From this perspective, the effect of the Civil War was limited to inducing the initial increase in labor input, especially that of women and children. The higher levels of input were sustained, however, by increased commercialization of product lines associated with female and child labor, as well as the desire to generate a cash flow that would permit the purchase of farm machinery.9 REVISED ESTIMATES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 9 Much discussion about the War's effect is couched in terms of benchmark data for 1860 and 1870, owing to a paucity of data for the war years. We focus on these benchmarks as well, in part for the same reasons, but also because we are interested primarily in the decade-long change in productivity. includes those two items. The annual rates of increase were 1.62 percent for the narrowly defined figure and 1.35 percent for the broad one. These were the fastest rates of increase of any decade of the nineteenth century and stand in sharp contrast to the statistical view presented by the series produced in the 1960s. The contrasting views that the two series give of the Civil War decade do not result from differences in their numerators-that is, from their estimates of agricultural output. The old series uses Towne and Rasmussen's output figures. The value of output for the many individual products underlying the aggregate numbers were estimated in various ways and are of differing reliability. For the years after 1840, including the decades of interest here, these figures are grounded in a variety of statistics collected by the Census Bureau and the Department of Agriculture.10 Although the figures may have some shortcomings, including the fact that they are available only for benchmark dates ten years apart and therefore do not cover the War years specifically, they are the best available and have been widely used. For the years 1860 10 These data were reworked by Strauss and Bean, "Gross Farm Income," and subsequently used by Towne and Rasmussen, "Farm Gross Product." The Towne and Rasmussen output measure, the value of farm output entering gross national product, is calculated as the difference between the total value of output and the value of intermediate products consumed in the process of production. Table 2 ). The adjustments he made to the broadly defined estimates are modest and have only a slight effect on the output per worker series, reducing its rate of growth by only 0.2 percent per year.11 Farm gross product, valued in current prices, increased during the 1860s by just over $1 billion dollars or about 70 percent. Much of this rise was, of course, nothing but inflation, the prices of agricultural products having gone up by about 40 percent over the decade. As Table  2 shows, output went up by around 20 percent in real terms, but the exact increase depends on the price base used. 12 In per capita terms the change was respectable in current prices, the narrow measure increasing from $47 to $64, or about 35 percent. In real terms, however, there was a slight decrease from $42 to $39. The broad measure shows a nominal rise from $49 to $66, but in real terms it fell from $44 to $41. 13 The evidence in Weiss's decision to place a smaller number of slaves in the 1860 farm labor force accords much better than Lebergott's estimates with other evidence about the occupational distribution of slave workers. Samuel Blodget's estimate for 1805 implies that only 75 percent of the slaves were engaged in farming, with 300,000 being "slaves to planters" and 100,000 being "variously employed." John Olson's sample data from plantation and probate records indicate that between 11 and 27 percent of the rural slaves were engaged in nonfarm activities.17 The figure The Civil War and Agricultural Productivity 533 occupations, clearly an untenable conclusion, given all the other activities that took place on the plantation and in rural areas more generally. 18 The effect of placing a smaller number of slaves in the 1860 farm labor force raises the level of productivity, but by only $9 (about 5 percent), and slows the rate of productivity growth between 1860 and 1870. The difference amounts to 0.47 percent per year: if the farm labor force were to include Lebergott's higher figure for slave participation in agriculture, the rate of productivity advance would have been 2.09 percent per year, but the smaller allocation of slaves reduces the rate to 1.62 percent, using the narrow definition of output.
Differences in the number of workers reported by the census as "laborers, not otherwise specified" (n.o.s.) allocated to farming is the single biggest source of the discrepancy between the two series' rates of productivity growth. The disparity springs from two independent adjustments, one affecting the size of the 1870 labor force, the other the figure for 1860. The revised 1870 farm labor force includes fewer of these laborers than does Lebergott's; the revised 1860 figure includes more.
Researchers have long recognized that from 1870 to 1900 the census had included in the category of workers n.o.s. many workers who were engaged in farming. Lebergott developed a method for distributing laborers in this category between farm and nonfarm industries by making use of the close connection between the farm/nonfarm and urban/rural split. He implicitly assumed, however, that all nonfarm laborers would be located in cities. Although most were, there were also many residing in rural areas where a great deal of nonfarm activity was taking place. From the data reported by the census Lebergott obtained a ratio of urban nonfarm laborers to urban population, which he multiplied by the entire urban population to produce an estimate of all nonfarm laborers. The residual count of laborers, predominantly those residing in rural locations, he placed in farming.19 This technique resulted in an underestimate of the number of laborers in nonfarm industries and an overestimate of the number in farming.20 Weiss 18 Lebergott estimated the number of slaves engaged in farming by assuming that 95 percent of the slave population aged ten and over lived in rural areas, 87 to 90 percent of which were engaged in farming. He intended to allocate only 87 percent of the rural adult slaves to farming, but in the calculation the 90 percent figure was used. Weiss used the county level data on employment and population for 1820 and 1840 to estimate that roughly 75 percent of the rural slave population aged ten and over was engaged in farming. 19 The Census did not report the population and labor force for all urban areas, but only a subset in each year: the 30 largest cities in 1870, 60 cities in 1880 and 1890, and 160 cities in 1900. The Census did report the number of laborers not otherwise specified living in those cities, and Lebergott felt that such urban laborers would include most nonfarm laborers. Lebergott, "Labor Force," p. 159. 20 The use of a ratio that included only urban laborers in the numerator would yield an estimate prices may have risen sharply during the War, most of the increases were not sustained over the decade, and those that were did not call forth additional output. Moreover, the extent of mechanization appears to have been too limited to explain the decade-long increase in output per worker.
Several factors contributed to higher agricultural prices during the War. There is no question that the demand for agricultural products by the United States and Confederate governments raised agricultural prices and must have encouraged some increased production. The situation was exacerbated by croprp failures in Great Britain from 1860 to 1863, a general shortage of food in continental Europe, . . . and the wasteful methods of Army supply."27 Most of the price increases were temporary, however; although prices rose during the War years, they fell after the conflict. Wheat prices actually declined over the decade, so they could not have been much of an incentive to increase production. The decline in wheat prices is quite telling, because wheat was the crop most likely to have become mechanized, but this was not the only case in which output and price moved in opposite directions. We calculate that the coefficient of correlation between the decadal percentage change in prices and the percentage change in quantity produced for 28 farm products was only 0.06.
There is also no question that there was a labor shortage during the War. The resources (human and material) ultimately demanded by the War surprised most contemporary observers. By 1865 more than two million men had served in the Union armies and 800,000 in the Confederate army.28 Paul Gates claimed roughly one-third of the prewar, nonslave agricultural labor force ended up in uniform.29 Although this proportion might be a little high due to the underreporting of women and children in the farm labor force, there is no question that the drain of farm labor was enormous. The demand for soldiers left farm households, often already hard-pressed for labor during harvest, shorthanded. One contemporary noted, "As early as August, 1862, some communities had only women, old men, and boys left."30 Although mechanization offered one possible response to labor shortages, only a narrow segment of agriculture did, in fact, mechanize. Wheat production was the primary focus of mechanization during the decade, based largely on the adoption of the mechanical reaper. Alan Olmstead, however, has raised doubts as to whether relative factor prices changed to induce mechanization, pointing out that farm wages 27 did not rise more rapidly than other wages and prices.3' Furthermore, whatever the rate at which reapers may have been adopted in the 1860s, the reaper's contribution to the increase in aggregate output per worker had to be relatively small.2 Wheat production accounted for only 9 percent of total farm output in 1870, and even less in 1860. Although the increase in wheat output was more rapid than that of most other farm products, it nevertheless raised the aggregate output per worker figure by only $7, or about 0.25 percent per year. One of the more striking features of the 1860s is that the decade had one of the slowest increases in agricultural output in the century and an even slower growth in the farm labor force. Moreover, although output grew faster than the labor force overall, its growth varied greatly by product. The production of only a handful of farm products increased faster than the labor force, but their rise was enough to propel the aggregate output per worker figure upward sharply. Wheat was one of those fast-growing products; the others were chickens and other poultry, eggs, dairy products, and especially hogs. Between 1860 and 1870 the share of farm gross product accounted for by these four livestock items rose by five percentage points, and their increased production pushed output per worker up by $28 dollars (1.1 percent per year) over the decade. Most of this increase was due to the rise in hog production.
A notable aspect of the composition of output during the decade was the shift toward products that typically engaged women and children. Contemporary commentators noted that although household members could be found performing just about every chore imaginable at one time or another, in general a division of labor existed among family members. Men were more likely to perform field work-plowing, sowing, and harvesting-women and children were more likely to work closer to home-dairying, churning, tending the garden, and caring for livestock. The production from these latter activities became more commercialized over the decade.33 This commercialization resulted only in part from the War's demands and was sustained by the development of the 31 Olmstead, "Civil War." 32 We estimate that there were 11.8 million more acres of wheat harvested mechanically in 1870 than in 1860. David, "Mechanization," p. 33, estimated that a self-rake reaper saved 0.36 man-days per acre harvested, and figures given by Atack and Bateman, To Their Own Soil, p. 190, place the bushels of wheat produced per man-day between 1840 and 1860 at 2.4. Thus, reaper usage in 1870 saved labor capable of producing 10.3 million bushels of wheat, only 9 percent of the increase in wheat output between 1860 and 1870. 33 Taking care of the dairy, garden, poultry, and livestock were primarily the responsibility of farm women and children. "It was the universal custom for women to tend the garden, just as they always milked the cows," wrote one contemporary quoted in Gates, Farmer's Age, p. 244; another claimed, "Except in a Yankee family no man or boy could be induced to milk cows, it being regarded as woman's work," (Bidwell and Falconer, History, p. 163); yet another noted that a woman "has duties to perform to the sick and to the well-to the young and to the aged; duties even to domestic animals" (Boydston, Home, p. 145). For a detailed discussion of the division of labor on northern farms and the role of women and children in the production of livestock and dairy products, see Craig, To Plant or Sow, chap. 2. stockyards in Chicago, the proliferation of rail lines throughout the Midwest, and the growth of urban markets in the Northeast. These improvements presumably made these items more remunerative and thus induced farmers to increase their production, either by shifting out of the production of other marketed items, reducing nonmarket production, or by reducing leisure time.
It is our contention that a substantial part of the overall increase in output for the decade reflects the fact that women and children were devoting more time and effort to farm tasks related to marketed output in 1870 than they were in 1860. They must have taken up some of the slack on a temporary basis during the War, and at least some of them must have remained more fully employed afterwards. The increased participation of these workers could have taken several forms: increases in their numbers, increased time at work per year, more effort per unit of time, or some combination of these factors.34
Whatever its determinants, the increased labor input of women and children is not fully captured in the census-based labor force statistics, including the revised series underlying the output per worker statistics in Table 1 . Because women and children were the workers most likely to be underenumerated by the census, any recorded increase in their numbers between the censuses of 1860 and 1870 may be inaccurate." Moreover, because the labor force series counts numbers of workers, not units of labor input or full-time equivalent workers, it cannot be used to measure changes in effort or in the amount of time worked. Although the increased labor input of these workers is not fully captured in the denominator of the conventional output per worker statistic, their increased output is measured in the numerator. It is clear that the labor input of women and children unmeasured by the census would have significant effects on the measured output per worker statistics.
We have devised a method to estimate the extent to which women and children worked more over the decade that bypasses the census enumeration problem. Although we cannot yet say to what extent more women and children worked or worked longer or harder, we can show that there must have been some significant increase in their labor input and that of men as well. I4 Increases in marginal productivity were also possible, perhaps especially those emanating from learning-by-doing. We try to account for this in our subsequent analysis. 35 The Census of 1910 addressed this problem by insisting that census takers record family members working on farms even if they received no wages. The result was a count of farm workers that was out of line with that reported for other years. Various researchers have tried to adjust for this "overcount." Most recently Weiss has estimated that the higher enumeration of female and child workers amounted to 950,000 workers, or approximately 2.5 percent of the farm labor force. See Weiss, "Adjustment," table 23 for a comparison of the various attempts to estimate the extent of the overcount.
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CHANGES IN TIME SPENT AT WORK BY AGRICULTURAL LABOR
We have gauged the increased contribution of men, women, and children by estimating an agricultural production function in which these groups are inputs even though they may not have been recorded as workers by the census. Although the discussion so far has addressed productivity change in agriculture for the entire United States, because of data limitations, we focus on northern agriculture only. We have assumed that the production function for northern agriculture was homogeneous, and that farmers exchanged inputs and outputs in competitive markets. As a result, the value of farm output, Y = P * Q. would have been allocated among the N inputs, X1, . . . , XN, such that the sum of the product of these inputs and the value of their marginal products is identically equal to Y. This relationship (Euler's equation) is given by
The value of the marginal product of input Xi is (aQlXi) * P, which in competitive markets would equal its factor price, such as its wage. Unfortunately, we do not know the value of the wages or marginal products for all the inputs, so we estimated the value of the marginal contribution of the various types of labor (including women and children) by subtracting from total output the returns to the nonlabor inputs.36 The value of output going to the remaining labor inputs is shown as Y* in equation 2.
Xk is the quantity of the kth different type of labor, and ok is the marginal product or wage of the kth labor input. One drawback to deriving the marginal products in this way is that we can not measure the inputs by unit of time-that is, hours, days, or months. We know only the number of workers, N, in each category, k. Thus, the equation actually estimated is 36 For an extended discussion and further application of this technique, see Craig, "Value"; and Craig and Field-Hendrey, "Industrialization." Fairly good monthly wage data exist for hired hands, and there are occasional references to wages for female domestics and hired children, but in general, comprehensive wage data are rare for labor not typically exchanged in the market, mainly women and children in the agricultural sector. For wages of hired labor, see Lebergott, Manpower, p. 539. contribution of every category of labor increased substantially during the decade.41 As we have noted, these changes may have resulted from a true increase in productivity, an increase in the amount of time devoted to market production, or some combination of the two. In Table  4 we estimate likely weights for these two possibilities for each type of worker. For adult males we can calculate in a straightforward manner the percentage increase in the amount of time spent working by using equation 4 and available evidence on productivity change.42 For women and children it was necessary to make some assumptions about how their productivity behaved relative to that of adult males; after we specified their relative productivity, 8, at the two dates, we solved equation 5. We made the calculation under three different specifications about the changes in their relative productivity: constant, increasing, and decreasing (see Table 4 ). 43 The results indicate that even adult males appear to have increased the amount of time they devoted to production for the market. If their productivity advance is gauged accurately by the change in their real wages, then the amount of time they put in at work increased by 29 regional dummy variables, whereas Craig reported separate estimates for each region. Our estimates include farm workers living in nonfarm households; Craig excluded off-farm labor and deducted the wage bill from gross output.
For the 1870 estimates we used only nonurban counties, where urban counties are defined as those in which 90 percent of the county's population lived in the largest city. See Atack and Bateman, To Their Own Soil, chap. 2, fn. 16. The ICPSR data do not identify either agricultural workers or individuals living in farm households at the county level. In order to obtain the agricultural labor input for each county, we subtracted from the total population of each state the number of workers in nonagricultural jobs reported in the published census volumes, divided the remainder by total agricultural acreage, and multiplied that result by the county acreage to obtain the county's population either employed in agriculture or unemployed in each rural county in 1870. We then calculated the farm labor force using a technique developed by Craig 4' Note that the signs and magnitudes of the other coefficients make sense. The omitted regional dummy variable was the Northeast, the region with the best access to urban markets; thus there was a premium in terms of net output from being located in that region. Similarly, there was a premium to owning a larger farm. Both of these results are supported by those reported in Atack and Bateman, To Their Own Soil, chap. 14; and Craig and Field-Hendrey, "Industrialization." 42 We used the change in the real monthly male wage to measure productivity change. Those wages were $13.66 in 1860 and $16.57 in 1870. See Lebergott, Manpower, p. 539. 43 According to the narrative accounts of farm wages for hired boys and women in northern farming, their relative productivity in 1860 was between 0.50 and 0.66. For 1860 we fixed the value at 0.66. See Schob, Hired Hands, especially the chapter titled "Hired Boy" and "Hired Girl." Craig, and Craig and Field-Hendrey argue that the true relative productivity must have been close to this proportion. See Craig, "Industrialization"; and Craig and Field-Hendrey, "Industrialization." In the increasing productivity case, we raised the ratio to 0.75, and in the decreasing case we lowered it to 0.50. The outcome of the other simulations shows either a constant or an increasing amount of time at work for women and girls, with the increase ranging from 3 to 65 percent. The result for boys is mixed, but nevertheless suggests strongly that they must have increased the amount of time spent in agricultural production. The greater the assumed increase in their productivity, the smaller the increase in any input's time at work. Yet even under the assumption of a substantial 38 percent increase in the productivity of boys, their time at work fell by less than one percent.
We believe these results generally support our hypothesis that farm workers increased the time they committed to agricultural production during the 1860s. Although we reached the same conclusion for all workers, the finding for women is especially telling. The increase in their time was substantial and resulted in an increase in the output of agricultural products in which they most likely specialized.
CONCLUSION
Using the conventional output and labor force data, we have shown that the 1860s saw the greatest increase in output per farm worker of any decade in the nineteenth century. This finding might seem to confirm the traditional view that the Civil War spurred an agricultural revolution, but we contend that the source of this apparent rise in productivity was actually an increase in labor inputs not captured by the conventional series. More important than mechanization was an increase in the time and effort men, women, and children devoted to the production of marketable farm products. The fact that much of this increase came from women is of particular interest. Perhaps the story of the Civil War's economic effects should be changed to correspond with that of another great conflagration, World War II. The Civil War had its counterpart to Rosie the Riveter-perhaps Hilda the Hog Herder-but unlike Rosie, Hilda appears to have continued in her new job after the War.
Our evidence has been confined to this one decade, and indeed to a comparison of just the beginning and terminal dates. We think it likely that during the War more women and children were used than in other years of the decade, and those employed during the War worked even more intensely than in other years. We also think it likely, however, that the increased participation of women and children persisted beyond 1870, as the commercialization of livestock production and the rise of garden and truck farming made their efforts more valuable. The share of farm output accounted for by dairying, eggs, poultry, and garden farming increased by 13 percentage points (in constant prices of 1910/14) between 1870 and 1900.
Increased man-or woman-hours is, of course, not the kind of "source
